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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF
MR. CREAN AND MR. MANN
MR. ROBINSON: Before Henry gets the microphone, I am going to use
the presider's prerogative to add a little coda to what you have been told by
our two extremely able and qualified presenters, namely, that what is going
on right now in Ontario is a very interesting example of what Michael was
talking about of the continued cooperation between Canada and the U.S. in
securities regulation. But it has an even broader implication.
I am a member of a little group of lawyers who has an informal off the
record breakfast meeting with the Chairman, David Brown, every few
months. Since it is off the record, I cannot tell you what we say there. I can
tell you that the SEC did not take the approach with Canada that you enact
domestic laws to match Sarbanes-Oxley or we are going to cancel this
MJDS, which is the usual reputation that the people give to the SEC.
Michael was not like that. Notwithstanding John Fetters and Waiver by
Conduct, which I did not agree with. The SEC is saying, Ontario, what you
do will help create a model for how other countries that are not as well
integrated in securities regulation and markets as Canada will do in their
domestic markets. Do not confuse a country adopting a Sarbanes-Oxley type
domestic securities regulatory scheme with the application of
Sarbanes-Oxley to foreigners. All of those 350 companies are listed on the
New York Stock Exchange from Canada, and there are more of them that are
all subject to Sarbanes-Oxley right now because they listed there. The
question is are countries going to say we are going to have a system of
regulation similar so that if you will continue to accord us things like the
MJDS that will extend mutual, if not, recognition, cooperation? What David
Brown is doing is being looked on as an example. He is between a rock and a
hard place because Canadians are saying we should not slavishly copy that
American rule. It is too strict. Some securities regulators are saying it is all
wrong. Out west in Alberta and Vancouver, they are saying, we have
different markets. We are more junior. The costs of companies complying
with Sarbanes-Oxley are too great.
Brown knows darn well that a lot of what is in Sarbanes-Oxley is good
and should be adopted. You are going to find out within about two months
exactly what he is going to do. Let me give you an example. John used to be
a victim of this. Sarbanes-Oxley absolutely forbids loans to directors and
senior officers of listed companies. All the Canadian banks traditionally for
100 years have remunerated their senior officers by giving them low cost
loans, so they can buy their house and buy the bank stock. They are all going
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to have to pay those loans back and get remunerated in a different way very
soon.
MR. MANN: That was a huge issue in MJDS, because virtually all of the
accounting firms had a conflict under the independence rules in the United
States. That was something that was accommodated in the MJDS, because,
otherwise there would have been no independence for any accounting firm in
Canada.
MR. KING: Does the Spitzer operation affect Canadians? In other words,
you know what Spitzer's doing in New York State. Curiosity consumes me
as to whether Canadians need to be concerned with what is going on down
there? Is it just a domestic operation or what is your advice to people on the
Spitzer operation?
MR. MANN: You mean, would I advise somebody to write an analyst's
report touting the security they were selling?
MR. KING: That is one of your clients.
MR. MANN: I think that anything can have a cross border
implication. Until CIBC sold Oppenheimer, I am sure they felt that they were
subject to Elliot Spitzer's investigation as they were issuing analyst's reports.
I look at Spitzer a little bit differently, because anything can have a cross
border implication for Canadians. Spitzer was raising an issue that he felt the
SEC was not sufficiently raising. Again, I would argue that that shows the
strength of the American regulatory system in that there are a variety of
avenues through which issues can percolate.
MR. KING: So, if you had a Canadian Grupman, you would be
concerned?
MR. MANN: Sure.
MR. ROBINSON: The TD bank owns TD Waterhouse, which is now
moving into advisory. It used to be just a discount broker. They are fully
subject to that sort of scrutiny, but it looks like Mr. Spitzer's got enough on
his plate looking at Americans without having to go north of the border.
MR. MANN: The opposite applies, as well. Schwab and Ameritrade got
in trouble with the Canadian securities regulators last year because they had
Internet clients who were based in Canada and they were not registered in
Canada. I think this is a proximity issue. The markets are very porous. If you
live in Detroit, the Detroit airwaves fill Canada, just as the Vancouver
airwaves fill Seattle. There has always been a substantial amount of cross
border activity. What is happening now is that it is being scrutinized much
more carefully. There is a lot more cooperation in scrutinizing it.
MR. ROBINSON: The Canadian dealers all got in trouble for servicing
their snowbird clients. When they go to Arizona and Florida for six months
of the year they want to be able to call their Canadian broker and sell their
stock in Bombardier before it drops right out of the bottom, but they cannot
because that broker is not registered there.
[Vol. 29:299
2
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 29 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 44
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol29/iss1/44
Crean & Mann-Integrity of Financial Markets
MR. MANN: That is another cooperation point that is worth making,
because there was a deal signed right before I left the SEC that allowed
snowbirds to still be serviced while they were in the United States.
MR. ROBINSON: That was classic cooperation in the day-to-day details
of the interaction of those markets.
MR. CARMODY: Chios Carmody, University of Western Ontario. Found
your presentations very interesting and was curious to find out on both sides
of the border what is being done about the phenomenon of social accounting.
For example, in Britain certain pension funds are now required to disclose
certain liabilities or other accounting type impacts that they may receive
from, for example, certain risky operations that they undertake abroad. We
have the phenomenon most recently in Canada of Talisman Energy in Sudan.
What accounting is being done of this and what attempt is being made to
incorporate some of these more unconventional measures into conventional
accounting?
MR. ROBINSON: Do you want to take that, John? I do not think very
much is being done.
MR. CREAN: As far as the banks are concerned, if we want to merge in
Canada, we have to supply a public impact type of report, but that is not part
of the accounting exercise. I know there have been one or two accountancy
firms that have looked at getting into this sort of thing, environmental and so
on, but that is not part of the disclosure requirements that one has under
GAAP.
I have some difficulty conceptually with that from two aspects. First of
all, the main charge for accountants is to comment on the integrity of the
financial statements of the firm they are auditing. They do not go into the
second order. The third order impacts on customers of the firm or people
who might be influenced by the activities of customers of the firm. That is an
incredibly difficult extension, made more difficult by the fact that an
awful lot of this stuff is inherently not easily amenable to measurement. So, I
would find it a little bit difficult. I mean, let me flip it a little bit.
Our regulator in Canada, the Office of Superintendent of Financial
Institution, has suggested that for good practice Canadian banks ought to
collect information and judgments on the caliber of governance in the firms
that they lend money to. As I said to the regulator, what criteria do we use for
that? If I am lending money to a privately owned company, which is
managed by a 70 year old owner who is very much in charge and has had a
wonderful track record, what do I write down on my internal memorandum
about the quality of his governance?
There is a real difficulty with this, because bank records are becoming
more and more subject to subpoena and scrutiny. What we have here, and we
have not really touched on it much during the sessions, is that we have a real
problem of capturing the limits we should put on regulation. There are real
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costs to increased regulation. Particularly when the objectives of that
regulation are ill-conceived so you cannot do any good cost benefit, certainly
not in the public eye, of the worth of these regulations. I understand the point
and I have sympathy with it, but I also have a little bit of horror of how you
actually put that in force. I come back to the use of markets. If a company
exploiting a market abroad is selling its securities at home, certainly the
commentators on the stock of that company can comment. There are some
real disadvantages to having operations abroad for a variety of reasons. I
come from the Bank of Nova Scotia.
MR. MANN: There was a move in the United States to see if there could
be some legislation written that would require that kind of disclosure. It was
motivated initially by Sudan. I think the view that ultimately was taken was
that it already required as part of management's discussion and analysis to
put in any discussion of material risks or to describe how the management
views its business when there are issues that are material to the firm.
In a way, the social issues such as Sudan are no different today than in
1975, when there was a call for there to be more environmental disclosure.
The framework exists already within the law to have the information
provided. Management needs to be focused on that as they are considering
how they describe the company. As new social issues arise, it is not because
it is a social issue. It is because it is a material risk. It is because it could
affect the investment in the firm. It could affect the way the firm is
considered.
If you were doing business in South Africa during the period of
Apartheid, it was something that needed to be disclosed because you could
be subject to embargo in other countries. That would create material risks.
From an investor's standpoint, it is giving the information that is useful for
investors. I think getting at it that way has been chosen, rather than having
affirmative obligations, which would be, as John says, quite soft.
MR. HAGE: Mr. Mann, you focused in your comments on the burdens
that Canadian securities firms, Canadian firms, have in the United States in
terms of issuing securities or regulating their trade. Are there any areas in
Canadian law where American companies would have a more strict level of
scrutiny?
MR. MANN: I think it is just sort of the anomaly of the market that there
are almost no American companies listed in Canada, just the trading market
is really in the United States. I have to confess, I am not aware of any.
MR. ROBINSON: I can help a bit on that. They may not list there, but
they certainly issue securities there. They suffer all kinds of nuisances of
having 13 Securities Commissions for the provinces and the territories.
There have been great efforts made to resolve that problem one way or
another. It looks like within a year we are going to get a solution. I am not
sure which one it is going to be. Ontario has put out a model Uniform
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Securities Law, hoping everybody will pass the same law. Then the
Canadian Securities Administrators, which all work together, are trying to
have a central place where they can say file your materials, then they would
be reviewed by that central place and comments fed in from the other
jurisdictions. Since it is a provincial jurisdiction, the Feds are lurking around
on the fringes threatening to impose a Federal Securities Commission, which
they would not ever try to do, because it would be another Constitutional
crisis. They have got enough problems up there with the Constitution.
MR. HAGE: I just had some difficulty following the logic of one of Mr.
Mann's examples. Maybe I misunderstood. I can understand why Canadian
companies or U.K. companies registered in the United States or trading in the
United States would be subject to American Law. The example you gave was
General Motors and its countless firms around the world being subject to
review in the United States. General Motors is going abroad to make money.
It is there to encourage or increase the profits of General Motors. Once it
goes abroad, which is its decision, why should it be subject or why should
accountants from Uzbekistan be brought back to the United States and
questioned?
MR. MANN: I actually just tried to use it as an extreme example
showing that even with an American company, the accountants could be
brought in. When General Motors puts out its consolidated balance sheet, it
includes all those 150 countries that are consolidated into its balance sheet.
So, even in their Korean company, everything comes back to their American
shareholders. The work that is done by the team is far flung. There is no
question General Motors is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. It
was just that its accountants that are doing that work that are providing it
then to Deloitte & Touche in Detroit for consolidation are also subject to it.
MR. CREAN: This is standard in Canada. When Bank of Nova Scotia
publishes its consolidated financial statements, we had a series of chartered
accountancy firms in the States, the U.K., and in 40-some odd countries.
MR. ROBINSON: Argentina?
MR. CREAN: No longer. They prepare statements and our two sets of
shareholder auditing firms rely upon the statements that float up from each
of these subsidiaries, in giving their statement of their opinion as to the
validity of the statements. It is perfectly normal. It is not an operation of
extraterritoriality.
MR. ROBINSON: In Michael's example, the value of the Uzbekistan
subsidiary is reflected in the statements based upon which the securities are
sold and traded in the United States. Why the heck should they not have to
account for how they did the statements?
MR. HAGE: My point was bringing them back for
cross-examination in the United States. Is that normal?
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MR. MANN: I was overstating it. I said they would have to be available
to answer questions.
MR. ROBINSON: Henry, I think we are going to break up a little early. If
we could all put our hands together for this panel.
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